Ideas from 'First-Order Logic' by Wilfrid Hodges [2001], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic' (ed/tr Goble,Lou) [Blackwell 2001,0-631-20693-0]].
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
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Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former)
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Full Idea:
A logic is a collection of closely related artificial languages, and its older meaning is the study of the rules of sound argument. The languages can be used as a framework for studying rules of argument.
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From:
Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.1)
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A reaction:
[Hodges then says he will stick to the languages] The suspicion is that one might confine the subject to the artificial languages simply because it is easier, and avoids the tricky philosophical questions. That approximates to computer programming.
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
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A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables
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Full Idea:
To have a truth-value, a first-order formula needs an 'interpretation' (I) of its constants, and a 'valuation' (ν) of its variables. Something in the world is attached to the constants; objects are attached to variables.
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From:
Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3)
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There are three different standard presentations of semantics
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Full Idea:
Semantic rules can be presented in 'Tarski style', where the interpretation-plus-valuation is reduced to the same question for simpler formulas, or the 'Henkin-Hintikka style' in terms of games, or the 'Barwise-Etchemendy style' for computers.
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From:
Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.3)
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A reaction:
I haven't yet got the hang of the latter two, but I note them to map the territory.
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I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I
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Full Idea:
I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I.
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From:
Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.5)
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A reaction:
[There should be no space between the vertical and the two horizontals!] This contrasts with |-, which means 'is proved in'. That is a syntactic or proof-theoretic symbol, whereas |= is a semantic symbol (involving truth).
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5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
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Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model
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Full Idea:
Downward Löwenheim-Skolem (the weakest form): If L is a first-order language with at most countably many formulas, and T is a consistent theory in L. Then T has a model with at most countably many elements.
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From:
Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10)
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Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models
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Full Idea:
Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: every first-order theory with infinite models has arbitrarily large models.
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From:
Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10)
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
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If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it
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Full Idea:
Compactness Theorem: suppose T is a first-order theory, ψ is a first-order sentence, and T entails ψ. Then there is a finite subset U of T such that U entails ψ.
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From:
Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.10)
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A reaction:
If entailment is possible, it can be done finitely.
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
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A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class
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Full Idea:
A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class.
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From:
Wilfrid Hodges (First-Order Logic [2001], 1.6)
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