Ideas from 'Logic and Conversation' by H. Paul Grice [1975], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Studies in the Ways of Words' by Grice,Paul [Harvard 1991,0-674-85271-0]].

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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

13856

Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones

			Full Idea: Grice argued that the truth-functional account of conditionals can withstand objections, provided that we are careful to distinguish the false from the misleadingly true.
			From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? 2

8948	The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions

			Full Idea: According to Grice, it is the rules that govern conversation beyond the merely logical that account for the counter-intuitiveness of the truth table for the material conditional.
			From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Jennifer Fisher - On the Philosophy of Logic 8.I
			A reaction: There is a conversational rule which says that replies should normally relevant to context. It would be nice if logical implications were also relevant to context.

13767

Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks

			Full Idea: Grice defended the truth-functional account of conditionals, noting the gap between what we are justified in believing and what is appropriate to say. .But the problem arises at the level of belief, not at the level of inappropriate conversational remarks
			From: comment on H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.1.3

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals

14277

A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it

			Full Idea: Grice drew attention to situations in which a person is justified in believing a proposition, which would nevertheless by an unreasonable thing for the person to say, in normal circumstances. I think he is right about disjunction and negated conjunctions.
			From: report of H. Paul Grice (Logic and Conversation [1975]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals (Stanf) 2.4
			A reaction: Edgington considers Grice's ideas of implicature as of permanent value, especially as a clarification of 1950s ordinary language philosophy.