Ideas from 'The Problem of Possibilia' by Kit Fine [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics' (ed/tr Loux,M /Zimmerman,D) [OUP 2005,0-19-928422-9]].

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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

9212	Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs!

			Full Idea: Possible states of affairs have often been taken to be propositions, but this cannot be correct, since any possible state of affairs is possibly a state of affairs, but no proposition is possibly a state of affairs.
			From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
			A reaction: The point is, presumably, that the state of affairs cannot be the proposition itself, but (at least) what the proposition refers to. I can't see any objection to that.

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

9213	The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been'

			Full Idea: A possible world can't be defined (by Stalnaker and Plantinga) as a way the world might have been, because a possible world is possibly the world, yet no way the world might have been is possibly the world.
			From: Kit Fine (The Problem of Possibilia [2003], 2)
			A reaction: His point is that any definition of a possible world must cover the actual world, because that is one of them. 'Might have been' is not applicable to the actual world. It seems a fairly important starting point for discussion of possible worlds.