Ideas from 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism' by Laurence Bonjour [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Epistemic Justification' by Bonjour,L/Sosa,E [Blackwells 2003,0-631-18284-5]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

8893	For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge

8888	The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence

8887	It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory

8897	The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs

8896	Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

8891	My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics

8892	Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input

8894	Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge

8889	Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism

8890	If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought

8895	If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present