### Ideas from 'On Concept and Object' by Gottlob Frege [1892], by Theme Structure

#### [found in 'Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege' by Frege,Gottlob (ed/tr Geach,P/Black,M) [Blackwell 1980,0-631-12911-1]].

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###### 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
 4975 A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate
 Full Idea: A thought can be split up in many ways, so that now one thing, now another, appears as subject or predicate From: Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892], p.199) A reaction: Thus 'the mouse is in the box', and 'the box contains the mouse'. A simple point, but important when we are trying to distinguish thought from language.
###### 6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
 9949 There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object)
 Full Idea: For Frege, the extension of the concept F is an object, as revealed by the fact that we use a name to refer to it. ..We must distinguish the concept, the object that falls under it, and the extension of the concept, which is the set containing the object. From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 A reaction: This I take to be the key distinction needed if one is to grasp Frege's account of what a number is. When we say that Frege is a platonist about numbers, it is because he is committed to the notion that the extension is an object.
###### 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
 18995 Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things
 Full Idea: Frege's theory treats existence as a property, not of things we call existent, but of concepts instantiated by those things. 'Biden exists' says our Biden-concept has instances. That is certainly not how it feels! We speak of the thing, not of concepts. From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by Stephen Yablo - Aboutness 01.4 A reaction: Yablo's point is that you must ask what the sentence is 'about', and then the truth will refer to those things. Frege gets into a tangle because he thinks remarks using concepts are about the concepts.
###### 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
 10317 It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects
 Full Idea: Expositors of Frege's views have disagreed over whether abstract qualities are to be reckoned among his objects. From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2.II A reaction: [he cites Dummett 1973:70-80, and Wright 1983:25-8] There seems to be a danger here of a collision between Fregean verbal approaches to ontological commitment and the traditional views about universals. No wonder they can't decide.
###### 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
 10535 Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of
 Full Idea: Frege's notion of an object plays two roles in his semantics. Objects are the referents of proper names, and they are equally what predicates are true and false of. From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.4 A reaction: Frege is the source of a desperate desire to turn everything into an object (see Idea 8858!), and he has the irritating authority of the man who invented quantificational logic. Nothing but trouble, that man.
###### 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
 9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties
 Full Idea: Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties. From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892], p.201) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.8 A reaction: I take this to be false, as objects can fall under far more concepts than they have properties. I don't even think 'being a pencil' is a property of pencils, never mind 'being my favourite pencil', or 'not being Alexander the Great'.
###### 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
 4973 As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate
 Full Idea: As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate. From: Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892], p.193) A reaction: All the ills of twentieth century philosophy reside here, because it makes a concept an entirely linguistic thing, so that animals can't have concepts, and language is cut off from reality, leading to relativism, pragmatism, and other nonsense.
###### 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
 9167 Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities
 Full Idea: Frege felt that meanings are public property, and identified concepts (and hence 'intensions' or meanings) with abstract entities rather than mental entities. From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by Hilary Putnam - Meaning and Reference p.150 A reaction: This is the germ of Wittgenstein's private language argument. I am inclined to feel that Frege approached language strictly as a logician, and didn't really care that he got himself into implausible platonist ontological commitments.
###### 19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
 4974 For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts
 Full Idea: For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts. From: Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892], p.196n) A reaction: Given the acknowledgement here that two very different sentences in different languages can express the same thought, he should recognise that at least some aspects of a thought are non-linguistic.