Ideas from 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' by Thomas Aquinas [1271], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Selected Philosophical Writings' by Aquinas,Thomas (ed/tr McDermott,Timothy) [OUP 1993,0-19-282946-7]].

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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

1848	We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason

1858	The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth

1852	For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

1860	Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will

1855	If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will

1853	Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will

1862	However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit

1861	The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it

1849	Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them

1856	Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will

1854	We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will

20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act

1846	The will can only want what it thinks is good

1847	The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means

1857	We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

1850	Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism

1851	Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

1859	Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process