Ideas from 'In a Critical Condition' by Jerry A. Fodor [2000], by Theme Structure
[found in 'In Critical Condition' by Fodor,Jerry A. [MIT 2000,0-262-56128-x]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
|
2474
|
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
|
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
|
2481
|
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
|
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
|
2505
|
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax)
|
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
|
2470
|
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q
|
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
|
2469
|
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains)
|
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
|
2475
|
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example
|
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
|
2502
|
How do you count beliefs?
|
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
|
2501
|
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images
|
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
|
2465
|
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
|
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
|
2504
|
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure
|
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
|
2493
|
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process
|
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
|
2494
|
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it
|
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
|
2503
|
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality
|
|
2508
|
The function of a mind is obvious
|
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
|
2485
|
Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
|
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
|
2506
|
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them!
|
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
|
2467
|
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
|
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
|
2489
|
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
|
2468
|
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
|
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
|
2490
|
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
|
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
|
2476
|
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories
|
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
|
2498
|
Modules make the world manageable
|
|
2509
|
Modules have in-built specialist information
|
|
2499
|
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do
|
|
2497
|
Something must take an overview of the modules
|
|
2507
|
Rationality rises above modules
|
|
2500
|
Babies talk in consistent patterns
|
|
2491
|
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness
|
|
2496
|
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts
|
|
2495
|
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation
|
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
|
2480
|
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
|
|
2487
|
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
|
|
2483
|
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
|
2486
|
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
|
2492
|
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
|
2471
|
Are concepts best seen as capacities?
|
|
2472
|
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
|
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
|
2482
|
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states
|
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
|
2477
|
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
|
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
|
2473
|
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction
|
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
|
2484
|
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work
|