Ideas from 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth' by Donald Davidson [1999], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Truth, Language and History' by Davidson,Donald [OUP 2005,019823757x]].
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Metalanguage for truth
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The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite

3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
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It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge
