### Ideas from 'Logical Properties' by Colin McGinn [2000], by Theme Structure

#### [found in 'Logical Properties' by McGinn,Colin [OUP 2003,0-19-926263-2]].

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###### 2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
 6052 Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity
###### 2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
 6064 Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation
###### 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
 6088 Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions
###### 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
 6084 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
 6085 The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
###### 3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
 6083 The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs
###### 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
 6086 Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts
 6087 Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony
###### 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
 6051 In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements
 6055 Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation
 6059 Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation
###### 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
 6042 The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool
 6067 Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'
###### 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
 6069 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied
###### 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
 6068 We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition
###### 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
 6070 Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality
###### 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
 6062 Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence
 6065 We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties
###### 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
 6082 If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities
###### 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
 6075 Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
 6058 Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
 6053 Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
 6043 Type-identity is close similarity in qualities
 6044 Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties
 6046 Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved
 6045 It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
 6066 Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
 6054 Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
 6047 All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
###### 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
 6049 Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'
 6048 Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity
 6050 Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity
###### 10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
 6080 Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties
###### 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
 6079 If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
###### 12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
 6081 Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge
###### 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
 6071 Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances
###### 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
 6077 Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
###### 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
 6074 Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?
###### 28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
 6072 If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence
 6073 I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined