Ideas of Daniel M. Mittag, by Theme

[American, fl. 2011, Professor at Albion College, Missouri.]

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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence
     Full Idea: While one might understand the proposition entailed by one's evidence, one might have no idea how or why one's evidence entails it. This seems to imply one is not justified in believing the proposition on the basis of one's evidence.
     From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Evidential')
     A reaction: An example might be seen if a layman tours a physics lab. This looks like a serious problem for evidentialism. Once you see why the evidence entails the proposition, you are getting closer to understanding than to knowledge. Explanation.
Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten
     Full Idea: If one came to believe p with good evidence, but has since forgotten that evidence, we might think one can continue to believe justifiably, but evidentialism appears unable to account for this.
     From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Forgotten')
     A reaction: We would still think that the evidence was important, and we would need to trust the knower's claim that the forgotten evidence was good. So it doesn't seem to destroy the evidentialist thesis.
Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it
     Full Idea: Evidentialism is not a theory about when one's believing is justified; it is a theory about what makes one justified in believing a proposition. It is a thesis regarding 'propositional justification', not 'doxastic justification'.
     From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Preliminary')
     A reaction: Thus it is entirely about whether the evidence supports the proposition, and has no interest in who believes it or why. Knowledge is when you believe a true proposition which has good support. This could be internalist or externalist?
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience
     Full Idea: Traditional coherence theories seem unable to account for the role experience plays in justification.
     From: Daniel M. Mittag (Evidentialism [2011], 'Evidence')
     A reaction: I'm inclined to say that experience only becomes a justification when it has taken propositional (though not necessarily lingistic) form. That is, when you see it 'as' something. Uninterpreted shape and colour can justify virtually nothing.