Ideas of Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E., by Theme
[, fl. 2013, At Oxford University.]
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
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19125
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If we define truth, we can eliminate it
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
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19128
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If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
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19120
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Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
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19127
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The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
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19124
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A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness
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19126
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If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
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19129
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The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent
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3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
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19130
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KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
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19121
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We can reduce properties to true formulas
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
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19122
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Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories
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