Ideas of Kathrin Koslicki, by Theme
[German, fl. 2008, Professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder.]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
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15118
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A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation
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17311
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Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
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15116
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Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
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13258
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The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
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13288
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Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations
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5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
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14506
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'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
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17435
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Objects do not naturally form countable units
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
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17433
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We can still count squares, even if they overlap
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17439
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There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
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17434
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We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
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17312
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It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
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14505
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Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
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17314
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The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
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17436
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We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
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13289
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Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
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14501
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'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
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14495
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I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object
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13264
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If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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13280
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Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution
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14497
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The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
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14496
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Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
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13279
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There are at least six versions of constitution being identity
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
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13283
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The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings
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14498
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For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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13266
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Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them
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14500
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Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties
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13281
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Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
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15110
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An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
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17313
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Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
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15113
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Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
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17309
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For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions
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17315
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We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
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15112
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If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
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15111
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In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena
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15115
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In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
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17317
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A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
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15117
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Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation'
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
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15114
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Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
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17316
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We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
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14504
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The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
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13285
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Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
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13287
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Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
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13284
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Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms?
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
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13286
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There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species
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