Ideas of L.A. Paul, by Theme

[American, fl. 2006, University of Arizona and Australia National University, then N.Carolina,Chapel Hill.]

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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds