Ideas of Ross P. Cameron, by Theme

[British, fl. 2008, Lecturer at University of Leeds, and St Andrew's.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18868 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are?
18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18867 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth
18873 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists
15395 Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths?
18931 Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker
18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc
18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers
18932 The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
15394 Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18869 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
18923 The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature
18926 One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths
18929 We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18870 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable
18871 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15102 S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world
18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true
18878 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18924 Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15401 Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings
15393 An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
15396 Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
18930 Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
15103 Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
18872 We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
15104 The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
18927 Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended?