Ideas of Amie L. Thomasson, by Theme

[American, fl. 2009, Professor at the University of Miami.]

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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable
The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Hofweber]
Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought
To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people
Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair'
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses
Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified
Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims?
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building'