Ideas of Edouard Machery, by Theme

[French, fl. 2009, Professor at the University of Pittsburgh.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
18559 Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
18564 Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals?
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
18573 For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts
18602 A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws
18604 Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different?
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
18565 There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18570 There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
18616 If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification
18614 Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories
18615 Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
18609 Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another
18610 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
18562 Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
18561 We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order'
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
18574 Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different
18588 Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location
18611 We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory'
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
18567 In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts
18569 In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / c. Concepts in psychology
18563 By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure
18557 Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements
18558 Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location
18560 Psychologist treat concepts as categories
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
18592 The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
18566 Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour
18584 One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification
18585 Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not
18578 Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
18575 The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
18583 Many categories don't seem to have a definition
18591 Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker
18590 Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
18594 Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction
18595 Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype
18596 Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype
18603 Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties
18606 The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise
18605 It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars
18593 The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
18597 Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular
18598 Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them
18599 In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
18587 The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach
18600 Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership
18601 Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains
18607 Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities
18608 If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
18577 The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
18589 For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
18612 Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
18613 Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry