Ideas of Edwin D. Mares, by Theme

[New Zealand, fl. 2001, Lecturer at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
17713 After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
18781 Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18789 Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction
18790 Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
18787 Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
18784 In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws
18793 Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
18780 Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence
18786 Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18782 The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
18783 Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18792 Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
18785 Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17715 The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17716 Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
18788 For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
17703 Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
17714 Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
17705 Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17700 The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17704 Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17710 Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
17706 The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations?
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
18791 In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
17701 Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
17702 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
17708 Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size