Ideas of J Ladyman / D Ross, by Theme

[British, fl. 2007, Professors at Bristol, and Alabama, Birmingham.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics

14912

There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science

14904

Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science

14907

Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science

14908

Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation

14910

Some science is so general that it is metaphysical

14940

Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics

14945

The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

14898

Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

14899

Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think?

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

14897

We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something

14936

A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything

14905

The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

14943

Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

14948

To be is to be a real pattern

14942

Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes

14947

Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality

14941

We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete

10493

If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics

14934

Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism

14909

Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical)

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations

14926

Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties

14929

A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations

14925

The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations

14931

That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties

14932

Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential

14920

If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

14952

Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it)

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

14950

Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects

14946

There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics

14927

Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals

14944

There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual

14928

Things are abstractions from structures

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object

14892

The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

14949

A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

14951

We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time

14958

A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability

14903

Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities

14923

In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism

14955

Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

14918

The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition

14891

There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction

14915

The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions

14916

What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences

14922

The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate

14921

The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

14953

Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved

14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction

14914

Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence

14913

We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification

14930

Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism

14939

Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism

14911

Science is opposed to downward causation

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds

14956

Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds

14957

There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation

14954

Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

14902

Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter

14937

That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics

14900

In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology

27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time

14901

Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic

14924

If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance?

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism

14938

A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible