Ideas of Peter Simons, by Theme

[British, fl. 2003, Professor at Leeds University, and at Trinity College, Dublin.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
15390 Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
12865 Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
12832 Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar
12834 Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional?
12815 Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us
12819 A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 2. Terminology of Mereology
12822 Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y'
12823 Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y'
12824 Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y'
12825 Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y'
12826 Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y'
12827 Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y'
12829 General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx)
12828 General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx)
12830 Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U'
12831 Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x'
12844 Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
12813 Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology
12816 Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well
12821 The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive)
18847 Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 4. Groups
12846 A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united
12848 The same members may form two groups
12861 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
12876 Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12845 Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
12838 Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass
12842 There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes'
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
12841 I don't believe in processes
12836 Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers'
8979 Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events'
8981 Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 3. Moments
12880 Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things
12883 Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis
12882 A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process
12881 A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
12840 I do not think there is a general identity condition for events
8973 Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
12839 Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
12879 Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12847 Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'.
12862 Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons
12863 Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
12858 Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient
12859 A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Edwards]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12850 To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
12860 Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
12886 A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
12835 Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail?
12857 Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
12820 Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
12866 Composition is asymmetric and transitive
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
12867 A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12864 We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
12817 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical
12814 Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence
12833 If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals
12849 Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals
12877 Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12888 The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12871 Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
12870 We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12873 Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12874 An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
12837 Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
12856 Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts
12885 Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
12854 An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end
12855 The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?'
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12872 The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12889 The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
18883 Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum
18884 Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
12843 With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
12875 One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work