Ideas of Katherine Hawley, by Theme

[British, fl. 2001, Lecturer at the University of St Andrew's.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are good at denying the obvious
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range
Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue?
Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property
Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one
The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties
Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves?
Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts
If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large!
Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing
If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was?
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object
Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects
An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages)
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations
The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to
Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds?
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals)