Ideas of Gideon Rosen, by Theme
[American, fl. 2002, Professor at Princeton University.]
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
14092
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Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
14100
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Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
18851
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Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
14096
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Explanations fail to be monotonic
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
14097
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Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts
14095
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Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14093
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An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
8915
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How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
18852
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A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
18850
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'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting
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18849
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Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant
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18857
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Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds
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18858
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Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another
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18856
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Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things
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14094
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The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18848
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Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity?
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18855
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Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14101
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Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws?
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
18853
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A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
8917
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The Way of Abstraction used to say an abstraction is an idea that was formed by abstracting
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
8912
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Nowadays abstractions are defined as non-spatial, causally inert things
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8913
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Chess may be abstract, but it has existed in specific space and time
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8914
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Sets are said to be abstract and non-spatial, but a set of books can be on a shelf
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
8916
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Conflating abstractions with either sets or universals is a big claim, needing a big defence
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
8918
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Functional terms can pick out abstractions by asserting an equivalence relation
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8919
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Abstraction by equivalence relationships might prove that a train is an abstract entity
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
14099
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'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
18854
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The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world
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27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
14098
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An acid is just a proton donor
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