Ideas of Alexander Bird, by Theme

[British, b.1964, At the University of Edinburgh, then Professor at Bristol University.]

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
6779 Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
9449 The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
9501 If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
9500 If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
6780 Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
9502 There might be just one fundamental natural property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9477 Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds
9490 The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself
9495 If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it
9492 Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
9503 To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14540 Only real powers are fundamental [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
9450 If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress
9498 The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
9474 A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out
9475 A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
9499 Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
9486 Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular?
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
9472 Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
9482 If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
9481 Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
6796 Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening
6797 Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
9505 Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
9491 Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
6800 Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
6786 As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
6792 If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start?
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
6757 Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
6805 Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity
6777 Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena
6804 There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
6778 Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
6775 Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
6791 If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge
6790 Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
6738 Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates
6739 Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses
6799 We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
6798 Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
6752 The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation
6754 We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
9487 We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
6750 Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
6761 Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
6758 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found
6759 Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
6756 Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely
6760 An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
6785 Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
6787 Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth
6788 Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
6751 Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
17527 Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early)
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
6776 Natural kinds are those that we use in induction
6767 Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours
6768 Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope
6770 Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation
6771 Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6773 If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
6769 In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds
6774 Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
6764 Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name
6766 Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition
6808 Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
17528 The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
9493 We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
6753 Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes
9494 Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17526 The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
6762 Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations
6763 Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working
6772 Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter
9507 Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
9488 Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
6740 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not
6741 There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental
6746 There may be many laws, each with only a few instances
6742 A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily
6743 If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily
6744 Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay?
6747 Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself
6749 We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together
6748 Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them
6801 Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual
6803 If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities.
9479 Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities
9496 That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
6745 A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong
6802 With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
9473 Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals
9484 If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
9506 Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
6789 If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
9489 Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
6807 In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
9504 The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be