Ideas of Stephen Mumford, by Theme

[British, fl. 2001, Professor at Nottingham University, then Durham University.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
9408 Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
9429 Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
9427 For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Realism
14334 Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
14306 Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
14333 Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
14302 A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14294 Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties
9446 Properties are just natural clusters of powers
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
14313 All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise)
14318 Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
14314 If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do
14325 Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14312 Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them)
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14291 Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things
14299 There could be dispositions that are never manifested
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
9435 A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
9447 If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
18617 Substances, unlike aggregates, can survive a change of parts
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
14295 Many artefacts have dispositional essences, which make them what they are
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
12248 How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 3. Combinatorial possibility
18618 Maybe possibilities are recombinations of the existing elements of reality
18619 Combinatorial possibility has to allow all elements to be combinable, which seems unlikely
18620 Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14309 Truth-functional conditionals can't distinguish whether they are causal or accidental
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14311 Dispositions are not equivalent to stronger-than-material conditionals
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
14319 Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
14342 General laws depend upon the capacities of particulars, not the other way around
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
14322 If fragile just means 'breaks when dropped', it won't explain a breakage
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
14320 Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure
14337 Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation
14343 To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
14324 Ontology is unrelated to explanation, which concerns modes of presentation and states of knowledge
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
14344 Natural kinds, such as electrons, all behave the same way because we divide them by dispositions
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
19068 Causation interests us because we want to explain change
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
9430 Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
9445 We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
9443 It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
14338 In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested
9444 There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
14339 Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
14340 It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs
14341 Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events
9416 Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances!
9415 Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B?
9431 Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions
9441 Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9421 The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them
9422 If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
9432 Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars
9433 If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
14345 The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
9434 Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
14307 Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them
9437 To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
9439 The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern
9412 You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert
9411 There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton