Ideas of Francesco Orsi, by Theme
[Italian, fl. 2015, PhD at Reading, then at University of Tartu, Estonia.]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
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18680
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To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
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18684
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Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
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18685
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Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake
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18666
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Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate
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18667
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The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response
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18679
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Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason
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18682
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A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts
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18683
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Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same
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18686
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The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
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18672
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Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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18677
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A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
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18668
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Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes
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18670
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The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value
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18669
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Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring
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