Ideas of S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum, by Theme

[, fl. 2011, Professors in Nottingham and Norway.]

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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
14562 A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
14541 Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
14553 Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
14538 Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14555 Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14557 Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14583 Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
14536 We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14584 The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14582 Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14542 If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
14535 Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
14561 Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
17535 Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality
14579 Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases
14580 Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14552 Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
14578 Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14549 Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
14585 We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
14576 Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
14551 If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple
14571 The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
14570 Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
14569 It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
14568 A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
14556 Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
14566 Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices
14577 Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
14563 Causation is the passing around of powers
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
14587 We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
14533 Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process
14558 A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones
14559 Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process?
14565 Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
14567 Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
14537 Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
14573 Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false
14572 Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause?
14574 Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
14539 Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects
14550 We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects
14546 Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
14575 A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
14548 There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
14554 Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers
14564 If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)!