Ideas of Fraser MacBride, by Theme

[British, fl. 2004, Reader at Birkbeck College, London, then at Cambridge, then Manchester.]

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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker
Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth
There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have
Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent
Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?
Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind')
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation
Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours