Ideas of Cynthia Macdonald, by Theme

[New Zealand, b.1951, Professor at the University of Canterybury, New Zealand.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles

7950	Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis

7923	'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred?

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition

7933	Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction

7944	Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations

7938	Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation

7967	Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

7965	Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge?

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

7934	Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations)

7958	Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars

7972	Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes

7959	How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way?

7960	Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals

7951	Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity?

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking

7964	How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them?

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

7971	Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

7955	Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location

7961	A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

7926	We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

7936	Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined

7930	The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique

7932	A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view

7937	When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology

7939	Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't

7940	A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

7948	A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum

7929	A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence

7941	Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular

7942	The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change

7943	A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

7927	At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law

7928	The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity

7947	In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself