Ideas of Paul O'Grady, by Theme

[Irish, fl. 2002, At Trinity College, Dublin.]

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1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / d. Contemporary philosophy
There has been a distinct 'Social Turn' in recent philosophy, like the earlier 'Linguistic Turn'
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
Just as maps must simplify their subject matter, so thought has to be reductionist about reality
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Logical relativism appears if we allow more than one legitimate logical system
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false'
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists say our theories (such as wave-particle duality) give reality incompatible properties
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We may say that objects have intrinsic identity conditions, but still allow multiple accounts of them
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Contextualism says that knowledge is relative to its context; 'empty' depends on your interests
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism was attacked by the deniers of the analytic-synthetic distinction, needed for 'facts'
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
If we abandon the analytic-synthetic distinction, scepticism about meaning may be inevitable
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Early Quine says all beliefs could be otherwise, but later he said we would assume mistranslation
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Cryptographers can recognise that something is a language, without translating it
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
The chief problem for fideists is other fideists who hold contrary ideas