Ideas of Sydney Shoemaker, by Theme

[American, b.1931, Professor at Cornell University.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
8558 One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
8559 Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
8594 People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
15091 Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
8596 Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal
8597 We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15092 Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker]
15095 A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity
15097 I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
8543 Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes
8551 Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them
8557 To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
15761 We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions
15756 Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
8547 One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties
15758 Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties
8549 Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
8545 A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers
15757 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional
15759 The identity of a property concerns its causal powers
15760 Properties are clusters of conditional powers
15762 Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing?
8552 If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination
4040 The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts
15765 Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects
12678 Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Ellis]
14534 Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
8548 Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
9485 Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8550 Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
8555 There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15099 If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
8554 Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
15101 Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15764 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know?
15098 Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible
15100 Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
8562 It is possible to conceive what is not possible
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
5691 The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly'
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
8593 Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
8556 Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5687 For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events?
5688 Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
1389 If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too
1390 Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [PG]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8542 If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8598 If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
15093 We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
8560 If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds
15763 If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity
8561 If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
8553 It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
4226 If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Lowe]
8595 If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years