| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality |
| 3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic |
| 7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) |
| 7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? |
| 7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' |
| 7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions |
| 7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax |
| 3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes |
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings |
| 3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin] |
| 3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Maslin] |
| 3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields |
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property |
| 3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations |
| 3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth |
| 3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs |
| 3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" |
| 3482 | Perception is a function of expectation |
| 3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) |
| 3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds |
| 3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation |
| 3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't |
| 3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial |
| 3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better |
| 3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones |
| 3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information |
| 3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it |
| 3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality |
| 3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background |
| 3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality |
| 3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally |
| 3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense |
| 3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision |
| 3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will |
| 3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained |
| 3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily |
| 3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component |
| 3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference |
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett] |
| 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder |
| 3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness |
| 3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something |
| 3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism |
| 3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property |
| 3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling |
| 3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity |
| 3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism |
| 3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston |
| 3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant |
| 3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect |
| 3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons |
| 3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? |
| 9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Kriegel/Williford] |
| 3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings |
| 3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it |
| 3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it |
| 3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena |
| 3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning |
| 3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' |
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent |
| 3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality |
| 3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind |
| 3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything |
| 3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men |
| 3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something |
| 3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour |
| 3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating |
| 3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit |