Ideas of Thomas Nagel, by Theme

[American, b.1937, Born in Yugoslavia. Studied with Rawls. Professor at New York University.]

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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated

3240	There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy

3269	If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful

3242	Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent

3241	It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

1489	Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity

20989

Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species

22354

Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Reiss/Sprenger]

3248	Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

4242	Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties

3291	Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

22429

We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities

3249	Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

3296	Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification

3247	Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs

3271	We can't control our own beliefs

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification

3270	Justifications come to an end when we want them to

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique

3252	Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism

1490	You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture

14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction

3251	Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind

3295	Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind

2957	Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Lockwood]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness

3286	An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self

3285	We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it

3293	If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me

3244	Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori

3245	The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness

3246	I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will

3292	The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies

3288	Can we describe our experiences to zombies?

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism

4883	Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett]

3287	We can't be objective about experience

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap

4989	Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use

4001	The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions

6479	Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does

22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value

3257	Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values

22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / d. Death

3265	We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death

22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / e. Altruism

3263	If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning

22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure

3256	Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance

22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck

3272	Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome

22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics

6450	Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives

22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory

3284	There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe)

23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory

6447	Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology

3261	Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty

3258	If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability

3282	The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes

3294	As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view

3254	If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory

3264	We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values

6446	In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative

6477	I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty

3255	We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism

3262	Utilitarianism is too demanding

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism

3268	If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one

24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle

3278	An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality

6448	A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial

25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality

3275	Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights

3277	In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual?

3281	The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality

25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality

3274	Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights

3273	Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic

6478	Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority

25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights

3276	A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

3290	Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat