Ideas of Jonathan Glover, by Theme

[British, b.1941, At Oxford University, then London University. Chairman of various government committees.]

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16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
4669 Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
4656 A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
4657 Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
4658 Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act
4659 It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on
4660 Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / b. Life
4661 What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain
22. Metaethics / A. Value / 2. Values / d. Death
4648 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3785 You can't separate acts from the people performing them
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
3786 Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting
22. Metaethics / B. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
4650 The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3784 Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3782 Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
3787 Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
4675 The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population
3783 How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
4654 Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people
4655 If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
4680 Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 2. Moral rights
4670 Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life'
4668 You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
4649 If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him
4651 Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents)
4671 What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted?
4676 The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths
4685 Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
4682 Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible)
4683 Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects
4684 Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying
4681 The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
4652 If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong
4665 Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks
4662 Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages
4663 If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so)
4664 If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too
4673 Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects
4666 If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people
4672 Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance
4674 It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother
4667 How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs?
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
4679 One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious