Ideas of Jerry A. Fodor, by Theme

[American, 1935 - 2017, A pupil of Noam Chomsky. Professor at Rutgers University.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
12644 Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
12633 Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
2474 It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
2481 Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
2463 A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality
2505 Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax)
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12619 We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
2470 Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
2435 Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
2442 Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12664 A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and'
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
3005 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties
12648 Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind
12650 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
12656 P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
12620 If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
2469 The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains)
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
7014 A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
12613 Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result'
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
2475 Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
12653 There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
12651 Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone'
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
2502 How do you count beliefs?
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
12628 Knowing that must come before knowing how
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
2501 Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
2990 Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned
3009 Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals
3008 Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
2465 Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
2504 Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
3978 Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together
12617 Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved
2493 According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
12625 Pragmatism is the worst idea ever
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
2494 Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
2462 Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
2461 An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time
2454 We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments
2455 Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused
2460 Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
2458 Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
2503 Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality
2508 The function of a mind is obvious
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
12636 Mental states have causal powers
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
2994 In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be
2443 I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
2453 We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
15473 How does anything get outside itself? [Martin,CB]
2485 Do intentional states explain our behaviour?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2981 Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons]
15494 We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining
7326 Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things
3976 Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws
3980 Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
12661 The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
2506 If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them!
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
2445 Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again
2446 Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
2599 Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3001 Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2467 Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
2993 Any piece of software can always be hard-wired
12632 In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
3011 Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
5498 Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2597 Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2985 Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons]
2489 Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2995 Supervenience gives good support for mental causation
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
2464 Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds
2468 Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
2991 Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought
2447 Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind
2490 Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas'
12624 Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
3002 If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought?
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2598 Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be?
3981 Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
2992 We may be able to explain rationality mechanically
2476 The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories
12641 Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts
12640 Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
2440 Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2988 Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have
3975 Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
2450 Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
22186 Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Okasha]
2491 Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness
2496 Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts
2495 Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation
2497 Something must take an overview of the modules
2507 Rationality rises above modules
2509 Modules have in-built specialist information
2498 Modules make the world manageable
2499 Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do
2500 Babies talk in consistent patterns
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
8090 Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Devlin]
2604 We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language
3010 Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese
2483 Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning
2487 Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language
2480 Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't
12643 Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
12647 Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory
12649 We think in file names
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
3135 Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Rey]
12655 Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them?
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2983 Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons]
3012 Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles?
2452 Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content
2432 Is content basically information, fixed externally?
2486 Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615 Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
2437 XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility
12630 If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
2441 Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties?
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
2999 Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism
3114 Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
12658 Nobody knows how concepts are acquired
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
11143 If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Margolis/Laurence]
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Lowe]
2492 Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience
12662 We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats
12635 Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept
12652 Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
2438 In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities
2471 Are concepts best seen as capacities?
2472 For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something
12626 Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12654 You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog'
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones
12659 Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product)
12660 One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
12629 For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference
12631 Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
12657 Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2439 Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences
2457 If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
2998 Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express
2482 It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
3006 Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth
2451 To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
3007 Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
3004 The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
3000 Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine
2433 For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning
2477 If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end?
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
3003 Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role
12634 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
2996 Mental states may have the same content but different extensions
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12642 Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers
12663 We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2436 It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth)
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
2434 Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts
12645 Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world
12646 Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2459 Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
2473 Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
2484 The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
12627 Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
3977 Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances