Ideas of Daniel C. Dennett, by Theme

[American, b.1942, Pupil of Gilbert Ryle at Oxford. Professor at Tufts University.]

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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
3798 An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
3801 Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14308 We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Mumford]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
7384 Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
2526 Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
3802 Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine?
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
7374 Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2523 That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3795 Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified)
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
7369 Brains are essentially anticipation machines
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
4608 Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
7393 We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious
7367 Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.
4880 Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons
2528 Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
2525 Maybe language is crucial to consciousness
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
7394 Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
7391 We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3158 Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it
2527 Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
6624 Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Lowe]
4873 What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7387 "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states
7658 Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
7376 We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
7372 In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special
7373 Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
3797 I am the sum total of what I directly control
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
7385 People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
4881 Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires)
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
7383 The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
7386 Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
7381 We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are
7382 We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7370 The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits
7655 The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3800 You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [PG]
3803 Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own?
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
3791 Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world
3794 Foreknowledge permits control
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
7379 If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
7365 Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
3159 Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques
3796 The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations
3161 If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey]
3986 The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2530 Could a robot be made conscious just by software?
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
7371 All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another
4875 We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
4879 There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7657 Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
7380 Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
7366 It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
4876 Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind
7656 I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
4878 The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3177 You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology
3987 Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
4874 The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas
2524 A language of thought doesn't explain content
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7654 What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3984 The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4882 Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
2529 Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees)
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
3983 Learning is evolution in the brain
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
4872 Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
7368 Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
3985 Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
4877 Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster?
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
3804 Darwin's idea was the best idea ever