Ideas of Chris Swoyer, by Theme
[American, fl. 2000, Professor at the University of Oklahoma.]
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10405
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In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10407
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Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
14594
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Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
14592
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Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space)
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
10421
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Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Anti-realism
10410
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Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
10399
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If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal
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10416
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Can properties have parts?
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14595
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Can properties exemplify other properties?
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
10417
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There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10413
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The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
10402
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Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
10400
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Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
10403
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If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
14593
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Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
10406
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One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
10404
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Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything
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18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
10408
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Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
10409
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Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
10401
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The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
10420
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Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
10412
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If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
10411
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Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers
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