Ideas of Michael Jubien, by Theme

[American, fl. 1992, Professor at the University of Florida.]

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
13395 If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
9967 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
13378 It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
13402 We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
13405 The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
13399 Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
13398 We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
11115 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses
13392 Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
9968 A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
9965 There couldn't just be one number, such as 17
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
9966 The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
9962 How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations?
9963 If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed
9964 Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
13404 To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
13386 If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
13403 The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
11116 Being a physical object is our most fundamental category
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
9969 The empty set is the purest abstract object
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13375 The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11117 Haecceities implausibly have no qualities
13393 Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
13388 It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
13384 Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility
13385 Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
13383 If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay
13400 If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
13401 The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13380 Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
13376 We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
13381 Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original
13382 Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
13379 If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same?
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
13394 Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
11119 De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
13391 Modality concerns relations among platonic properties
13374 To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
11118 Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual
11108 Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities
11111 Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
11105 We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
11106 If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
11107 If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
11112 Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
11109 If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
11113 Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
13389 The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
13390 Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
13396 Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
13377 First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects