Ideas of George Molnar, by Theme

[Australian, 1934 - 1999, Born in Hungary. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
11912 Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11920 A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11919 Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
11929 The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
11927 Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
11915 If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
11916 'Being physical' is a second-order property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
11956 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
11928 Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
11933 A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation
11932 Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
11934 The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality
11947 Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects
11952 The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers
11953 Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
11943 Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
11939 If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
11914 Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
11962 Nominalists only accept first-order logic
11913 For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
11955 There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts
11917 Structural properties are derivate properties
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11918 The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
11963 What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
11951 Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
11936 The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
11935 Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
11944 Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
11960 Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
11937 We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
11954 We should analyse causation in terms of powers
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
11961 Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11959 Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true
9448 Location in space and time are non-power properties [Mumford]
11930 One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
11957 It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
11921 The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
11931 Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small