Ideas of Nathan Salmon, by Theme

[American, b.1951, Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
18889 Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been
14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false
14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14627 S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Williamson]
14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether
14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been
14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
14742 It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
18888 Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be
14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions
14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been
14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18886 Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
18887 The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value
18885 Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
18891 Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different