Ideas of Nathan Salmon, by Theme
[American, b.1951, Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara.]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
18889

Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684

A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669

For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14667

System B has not been justified as fallacyfree for reasoning on what might have been

14668

In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false

14692

System B implies that possiblybeingrealized is an essential property of the world

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671

What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14627

S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Williamson]

14686

S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether

14691

S5 believers say thatthingsmighthavebeenthatway is essential to ways things might have been

14693

The unsatisfactory counterparttheory allows the retention of S5

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670

Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..)

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
14742

It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
18888

Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678

Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical antiessentialist

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680

Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14677

Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever

14679

Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted

14685

Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted

14690

In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there

14688

Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681

Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676

Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689

Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674

Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be

14682

Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions

14687

Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683

Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672

Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been

14675

Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673

You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18886

Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
18887

The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value

18885

Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
18891

Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks antiessentialism; water structure might have been different
