Ideas of Hartry Field, by Theme

[American, fl. 1992, Professor at University of Southern California, and then New York University.]

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2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
10825 The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
10820 In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
13499 Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Hart,WD]
10818 Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
10817 Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
9570 In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
10260 Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10819 Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10827 Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
9226 If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
8958 In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Szabó]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
18221 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
8757 The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
18212 Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
10261 The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Shapiro]
18218 Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space
9623 Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
18215 It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
18210 Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions?
18214 Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful
18216 Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements
8714 Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
18211 You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
8959 Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Szabó]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
18213 Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct'
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
18222 Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
10826 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
9917 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
22244 'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8404 Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8400 Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones
8401 Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation
8402 The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
18223 In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
18220 Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
18219 Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously