Ideas of Gabriel M.A. Segal, by Theme

[American, fl. 2000, At King's College, London.]

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science

3123	Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason

3125	Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity

3105	Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible

3106	If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious

14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation

3113	The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology

3112	Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions

18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content

3118	If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things

3119	Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms

18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth

3108	If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ

3110	Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible

3124	Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

3109	If content is external, so are beliefs and desires

3117	Concepts can survive a big change in extension

3116	Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users

3104	Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?

3111	Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference

3103	Maybe content involves relations to a language community

18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content

3121	If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts