Ideas of Christopher Peacocke, by Theme

[British, b.1950, Formerly of New College,Oxford University, then at New York University, then University College,London.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Most people can't even define a chair
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy
Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Machery]
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Machery]
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire?
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it
A concept is just what it is to possess that concept
Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Greco]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Horwich]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional