Ideas of Fred Dretske, by Theme

[American, b.1932, Professor at Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin.]

green numbers give full details    |    back to list of philosophers    |     expand these ideas
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the power of metarepresentation
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [DeRose]
Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q
We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real
Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication
Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q
The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure
P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails
We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception
Introspection does not involve looking inwards
Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions