Ideas of Paul Horwich, by Theme

[British, b.1947, At University College, London, and New York University.]

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2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition?
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6334 The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6342 Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
6332 The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
6335 The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
23299 Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Davidson]
6337 The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory
6336 No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth
6344 Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6339 Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
8431 Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
2798 Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
2799 Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6338 We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
6340 There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6341 Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8432 Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around