Ideas of Wesley Salmon, by Theme

[American, 1925 - 2001, Professor at the University of Pittsburgh.]

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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
13047 It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that'
13065 Understanding is an extremely vague concept
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
13054 Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
13067 For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
13055 Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
13046 Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar
13058 Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
14366 An explanation is a table of statistical information [Strevens]
13050 The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments
13059 Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts
13064 The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13049 We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things
13051 Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain
13053 A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13061 Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
17492 Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan]
17093 Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms
13045 Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms
13062 Does an item have a function the first time it occurs?
13063 Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts
16557 Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
13060 Can events whose probabilities are low be explained?
13056 Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability
13057 Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8412 A causal interaction is when two processes intersect, and correlated modifications persist afterwards
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8413 Cause must come first in propagations of causal interactions, but interactions are simultaneous
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8411 Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation
4784 Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8409 Probabilistic causal concepts are widely used in everyday life and in science