Ideas of Jaegwon Kim, by Theme

[American, b.1934, Born in Korea. Professor at Cornell University, then at Brown University.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
2319 Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
3426 If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
4779 For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Psillos]
10369 How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Schaffer,J]
8974 Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Simons]
8976 If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons]
8975 Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Simons]
8977 Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons]
8980 Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
2317 Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [PG]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
3536 Supervenient properties must have matching base properties
2310 Supervenience is linked to dependence
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
2315 Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
13746 Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation
13745 Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence
3431 Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Reality
2329 Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Physicalism
3437 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15456 Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
3430 Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
3432 Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property?
3434 Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things
2320 Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
3436 Should properties be individuated by their causal powers?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
3406 Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8825 It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
530 There are two contradictory arguments about everything
13314 Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Seneca]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1547 Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
1550 Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato]
2065 Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
14470 Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
3368 Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
3392 Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers
3396 Experiment requires mental causation
3397 Beliefs cause other beliefs
2318 Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [PG]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
3367 Both thought and language have intentionality
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3365 Intentionality involves both reference and content
2325 It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
3360 Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
3366 Pain has no reference or content
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
3389 Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional
3391 Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [PG]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
3422 Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
3363 We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing
3412 How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3409 Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
3399 If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3390 Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas?
3414 What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
3359 Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
3369 Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural
3428 Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
3380 Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation?
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3370 What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs?
3371 Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together
3372 Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states
3373 Snakes have different pain behaviour from us
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
3379 Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
3388 Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
2324 Intentionality as function seems possible
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
3384 The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
3393 How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3439 Reductionism gets stuck with qualia
3427 Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical
2314 Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3376 We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
3424 Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
2313 Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
2328 The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
3413 Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience
3362 Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible
2309 Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
2311 Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3374 Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3433 The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
3377 Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
3438 Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level
3440 Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
2308 Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2322 Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
2327 Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
3375 If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
3411 How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions
2323 Emotions have both intentionality and qualia
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3387 A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling
3386 Folk psychology has been remarkably durable
3394 Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory
3410 Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
3382 A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test
3383 The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3408 Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds
3420 Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3416 Content may match several things in the environment
3421 Content is best thought of as truth conditions
3418 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3419 Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external
3417 Content depends on other content as well as the facts
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3402 If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction
3403 We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8430 Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
3535 All observable causes are merely epiphenomena
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3401 A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8396 Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Tooley]
8429 Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation
8428 Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
3407 Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4781 Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Psillos]