Ideas of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, by Theme
[American, fl. 1995, At Loyola University, Marymount; then at the University of Oklahoma.]
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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
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20186
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Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused
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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
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19694
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Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Whitcomb]
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
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20221
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Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
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20220
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Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
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20188
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Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding
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20223
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Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
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20217
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Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
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20191
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Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
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20222
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Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
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20225
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For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap
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20226
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Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked
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20228
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We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth
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20227
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Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
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20194
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Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue
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20206
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Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples)
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20208
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We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices
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20210
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A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them
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20215
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A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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20187
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Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
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20218
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The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
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20205
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The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
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20202
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Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
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20216
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Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
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20193
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Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
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20199
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Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
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20196
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Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues
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20200
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A virtue must always have a corresponding vice
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20201
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Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [PG]
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20203
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Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends
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20207
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Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
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20214
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Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
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20213
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We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
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20209
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For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
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20197
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The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having
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