Ideas of Gareth Evans, by Theme

[British, 1946 - 1980, Wilde Reader at Oxford University. Died of cancer.]

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

9038	We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes

5824	How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?

9042	A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

9041	The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

16129

Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Lowe]

16459

Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?

16460

Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Lewis]

16457

There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Lewis]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

14484

If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Thomasson]

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

16224

There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [PG]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency

14895

'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation

11881

Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Mackie,P]

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

7639	The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

12580

Experiences have no conceptual content [Greco]

7643	We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts

16366

The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities

12575

Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Peacocke]

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

5825	Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information

5823	The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description

9039	If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit

19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature

9043	We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity

9040	Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs