Ideas of Gareth Evans, by Theme

[British, 1946 - 1980, Wilde Reader at Oxford University. Died of cancer.]

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Lowe]
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Lewis]
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [MaciÓ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Mackie,P]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Experiences have no conceptual content [Greco]
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Peacocke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs