Ideas of Tim Crane, by Theme

[British, b.1962, Professor at University College, London.]

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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

4098	The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience

4077	Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience

4078	Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Facts / a. Facts

8386	Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties

4082	The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague

4083	If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties

4079	Properties are causes

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

4068	Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs

4097	Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs

4096	Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How

4093	Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere)

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities

4108	Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

4104	One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine

4105	The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems

4101	If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see

4102	The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

4109	If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory

4103	The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

4065	Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness

4092	The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality

4087	Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes

4095	Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

4106	If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

4089	Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

4090	Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia

4107	With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism

4069	Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism

4074	Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique

4091	The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism

4070	Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism

4084	Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind

4080	If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind

4075	Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation

4085	Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument

4073	Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique

4072	The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument

4094	Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience

18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth

4100	The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false.

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

4067	Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought

18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension

4063	In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause

4071	Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation

8387	A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata

4076	Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction

8384	The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof

4066	It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate