| 14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism |
| 14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? |
| 14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds |
| 16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Stalnaker] |
| 14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts |
| 14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? |
| 14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties |
| 13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Westerhoff] |
| 14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified |
| 14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? |
| 14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it |
| 14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) |
| 14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world |
| 14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? |
| 14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties |
| 14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it |
| 14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' |
| 14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true |
| 14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? |
| 14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent |
| 14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies |
| 11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual |
| 14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. |
| 18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Armstrong] |
| 16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker] |
| 11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs |
| 14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? |
| 11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different |
| 11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos |
| 11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties |
| 11891 | Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Mackie,P] |
| 11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates |
| 11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently |
| 6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 9086 | The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction |
| 9087 | Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts |
| 16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Stalnaker] |
| 16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker] |
| 14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one |
| 9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths |
| 9084 | Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true |
| 20704 | A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Davies,B] |
| 1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [PG] |
| 1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [PG] |