Ideas of Jonathan Dancy, by Theme

[British, fl. 1985, At Keel University, then Professor at Reading University.]

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
2797 As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
2768 The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
2765 Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy
2769 If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
2766 Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
2781 Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
2745 A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
5677 Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
5678 Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly
5681 Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
5682 Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects
5683 Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
2778 Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
5684 Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
2777 Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
2794 Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
2780 Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
5679 We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like
5680 For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
2782 We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
2775 It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
2784 Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality
2785 Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2788 If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality
2790 I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5)
2787 Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation
2791 Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
2754 Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
2749 For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief
2770 Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
2752 Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification
2771 Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
2756 If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2753 Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
2773 Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism
2779 Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists
2786 For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
2767 If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
2776 Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
2746 How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die?
2747 Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
2772 Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
2743 What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument?
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
2751 Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
2757 The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone
2758 You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
2744 Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism
2760 Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2761 If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language?
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
2763 There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
2762 Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
7260 If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them?
7261 Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed
7262 Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it
7265 Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18681 The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Orsi]